Il Casolare Unfiltered Extra Virgin Olive Oil 1L

Il Casolare Unfiltered Extra Virgin Olive Oil 1L

Marsoni

M251S

$25.78

Get it in 3 business days with 1 day shipping. Friday, May 29

Il Casolare Unfiltered Extra Virgin Olive Oil 1LUnfiltered Extra Virgin Olive Oil. Superior category Olive Oil obtained directly from olives and solely by mechanical means. The olive oil has been cold extracted by mechanical means to obtain a first class extra virgin olive oil. This cold process produces extra virgin olive oil which maintains its high quality resulting in a full and distinctive flavour. Features: Extra Virgin Unfiltered Olive Oil, Naturally Cold Extracted, A fruity and balanced

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This is the final volume in Rodger's three part series. This coves a lot of ground that includes Britain's height of imperial/naval hegemony and then its exhaustion after two world wars. Read this book if you want to learn about the details that actually go into an important national organization like the Royal Navy. Things like politics, administration, logistics, ship design, talent pipelines, engineering difficulties, etc. Rodgers goes deep. Things like: 1) Fire control on big guns on warships is a very hard technical challenge and wasn't really solved until the 2nd World War with more advanced electronics. 2) In the coal fired age of ships, most of the navy were coal stokers. The limit of range was actually their exhaustion, not how much coal was on board. 3) Twice the number of bombs were dropped on Malta in WW2 as on London during the Blitz! 4) Britain's naval dominance was tied to economic dominance and was sea power/trading based. Sea based trade is so powerful and economical that it was cheaper to ship a ton of coal by sea than train within Britain itself! 5) Britain had a monopoly over undersea cables for global communications. They used this as a weapon to spy on enemy communications and to cut off others access to the network. Sound familiar to the SWIFT banky network today? 6) Welsh coal was the best coal. So good that the Austo-Hungarian navy stockpiled before the war enough that they used it exclusively throughout WW1.

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Reviewed in the United States on November 16, 2025

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J. Armstrong

Alexandria, US

★★★★★ 5

A clear and concise book

Format: Hardcover

Fascinating book. Berntsen provides some interesting insights and recommendations on how we should fix problems at the CIA and in the national security apparatus. At a time when most critics want to destroy the Agency, Berntsen provides some plain spoken sanity. Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism and National Leadership needs to be read by anyone entering into defense, foreign affairs or intelligence - and anyone else with an interest in how the CIA works. It is a fast and enjoyable read.

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Reviewed in the United States on November 17, 2008

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Retired Reader

Lowell, US

★★★★★ 4

Skimming the Surface

Format: Hardcover

The essence of this book is to succinctly explain the role of CIA's National Clandestine Service (Directorate of Operations) in formulating and more importantly executing a coherent counter-terrorism strategy. Gary Berntsen is a retired CIA intelligence officer (clandestine service) with an impressive record of field assignments to his credit. He also clearly knows the ways of Washington D.C. in that this book is designed for those suffering from attention deficit disorder. While he raises several interesting point in the book, he also reveals an astonishing narrowness of view and tendency to reduce everything to its simplest terms. In his introductory `background' chapter Berntsen makes the dubious claim that the collection of intelligence from human sources (HUMINT) is the "primary mission of CIA." Apparently he is unaware that CIA was originally founded to produce all source finished intelligence and that the National Intelligence Council (NIC), until recently under CIA, was the final word in the U.S. Intelligence System. Nothing reveals the sorry state of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence better than this claim. In the same manner Berntsen is apparently oblivious to the availability and uses of intelligence collected by technical means. To his credit he does recognize that the best intelligence is more often available from open (non-classified) sources than from secret sources. Yet he neither expands nor follows up this observation. Berntsen more or less follows this pattern through out this book. For example he provides a brief discussion of the traditional Islamic Banking System called Hawalla, but is apparently unaware that the system is based on a recognized credit not cash and that money does not move across international borders. The system is widely trusted and is widely used by Muslim expatriates in the West and Saudi Arabia to send money home. For this reason Hawalla credit transfers providing money to terrorists are easily lost in a world wide mass of transactions. Yet it is possible to track Hawalla transactions and it has been done without "intensive manpower" allocations. Berntsen deserves a good deal of respect and credit for his obvious service to the U. S. and his dedication to the cause of clandestine intelligence operations and its hand maiden covert operations. Yet this book is a terminally superficial and ill-considered work by someone who not only should know better, but could have produced a first rate `practical guide' to a counter-terrorism strategy.

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Reviewed in the United States on October 30, 2008